Speeches

Mr President, I will just use the opportunity to say thank you all for your input. And thank you, Commissioner, for your input into today's debates. I am glad to hear that almost all of us are on the same page about this issue and the importance of this issue, and we all basically agreed that our biggest challenge is speed. So, later today when this report ‑ I hope ‑ will be approved, nothing ends with that. It actually will be the start. And we will need to push the Commission to implement all this strategy.

Mr President, dear colleagues, first, I would like to thank all the shadow rapporteurs and advisers in the committee secretariat for all the great work they have done on this report. This is not a political report; this is a blueprint for what Europe must do to stand against real and growing threats – threats that rise above ideologies or political beliefs. These threats are no longer hypothetical or distant: some EU Member States are already facing them today, and the situation will only deteriorate. That is why we must prepare ourselves faster than the threats are evolving. Drones have not only completely changed modern battlefield, but have also become a weapon of hybrid warfare. They can be used by any aggressive regime or terrorist organisation to attack critical infrastructure, paralyse airports or disrupt our societies. We must be ready – not by 2030, but much sooner. This report contains more than 300 concrete recommendations, which can be grouped into several key pillars. We must create an environment in which European industry can deliver state-of-the-art drones and counter-drone capabilities. We must urgently address supply chain dependencies. Today, around 60 % of drone components come from the US or China, while critical raw materials are even more exposed. Strategic partnerships and stockpiles can be the answer. We need a fundamental overhaul of EU defence funding instruments. Grants and financial envelopes must be more flexible, open to non-traditional vendors, and designed for real operational impact and cost-efficiency. Certification procedures and regulations must be adopted, not only to increase speed, but to ensure that SMEs – which are often at the technological forefront – are not blocked by outdated rules. We must invest in workforce and manufacturing capacity through open architectures and interoperability. EU-funded drone systems should follow open modular standards, enabling plug-and-play components from multiple suppliers, aligned with NATO standards. Because drone technology evolves rapidly, those who protect us must always have access to the best available solutions. Procurement and sourcing must be adapted through pre-approved vendors, priority-rated orders and regulatory fast-tracking so drones and counter-drone systems can reach the field without delay. Cooperation is essential. NATO and the EU must work closely, fully exploiting their complementary roles in strengthening European defence and deterrence. The Commission should propose legally binding instruments to ensure NATO standards are followed. But everything mentioned before will be completely useless without people who know how to operate all the systems our industry will deliver. We should also encourage Member States and Ukraine to jointly train and certify drone operators with standards equivalent to those of artillery or unmanned vehicle operators. Knowledge transfer between Ukraine, NATO and the EU must be institutionalised through staff exchanges and expanded joint training programmes. Finally, we must be honest with ourselves: technologies evolve fast and no solution will ever make us 100 % safe. This will always be a race between drones and counter-drones, and we will not always be ahead. That's why civil defence shelters and productive infrastructure must be developed alongside a revised civil preparedness strategy. Our citizens must know what to do and where to go in the event of drone attacks. So let's hope for the best, but be ready for the worst.

Madam President, Commissioner, Dear colleagues, The first call for a legal basis for the confiscation of Russian frozen assets was made here on 9 November 2023. Since the full-scale invasion, direct calls to confiscate these assets and transfer them to Ukraine have been included in at least six resolutions. It is a pleasure that there is at least some movement at last, and I understand the concerns of some Member States about the legal consequences. Responsibility must be solidarity-based and a solution must be found. What I cannot understand is the fear of losing investor confidence. What investor? The dictator and the aggressor? How much more do we have? It seems to me that this is exactly what we need to tell them. If you are going to invade an independent country, you will lose everything. And more. When we finally arrive at the handover of Russian assets to Ukraine – and I believe that we will arrive – we need to ensure that this really is a complement, not a replacement, to the existing support to Ukraine.

Madam President, Commissioner, Dear colleagues, This time I will not talk so much about Russia – everything seems to have been said about it. We also know what we should do, but we do not. The frozen assets are standing where they stand, the shadow fleet continues to fulfill the Kremlin's treasury, and now we also have drones above Europe. And as long as we do not respond in a way that hurts Russia, they will continue to consider us as sufferers who can and should be frightened and humiliated. Condemnation and resolutions are unfortunately not working. That's what we know. "Readiness 2030" is a good plan, but as far as drones are concerned, we need to move to the "Readiness 2020" plan today, because drones as a weapon are here to stay with or without Russia. And if we plan to discuss for a long time what kind of environmental requirements should or should not apply to the defence industry, then we should hurry to start thinking about the day when 500 Shahed will be above Europe, how we will warn and protect our people, because neither we nor our environmental requirements will be able to stop them.

Hello, dear colleagues, Commissioner, President-in-Office, Since the last debate on Ukraine, thousands more missiles and drones have been fired on Ukrainian civilians. Hundreds more have died, including many children. But one relatively good thing has happened at this time, and here I agree that I have to thank Mr. Trump for showing the whole world how diplomacy works in relations with Russia. Each conversation means new, record-breaking attacks on Ukrainian cities with missiles and drones, because Russian politics is very simple – speaking in its sense is a weakness, and Russia’s borders are where it gets through its teeth. They themselves declare this from time to time. Since it is only the fear of the aggressor to remain without these teeth that can provide security guarantees for both Ukraine and Europe. And these fears can't be achieved with anything that's out of paper. Only a strong army and defence industry can provide genuine security guarantees in Europe, and I do not deliberately separate Ukraine, because Ukraine is Europe.

Dear Chair, Hello, colleagues! 77 days have passed since the last debate on Russian war crimes. These are about 2,500 drones and 160 missiles fired by Russia through Ukrainian cities. Several hundred civilian casualties, several dozen children. Several talks have taken place in different formats, but Russia continues to do the only thing it can: terrorise civilians, deport and torture. Do everything to destroy or at least break those nations that do not want to submit to the Russian world. It's nothing new. The Baltic States, Ukraine and many other countries have all gone through this during the Soviet occupation. And why does Russia do this? Because they can! Because they have never been punished before for such crimes, and are sure that this will not happen at the moment either. And it will not happen because we cannot still give up Russian resources and we still cannot provide Ukraine with everything it needs to defeat and punish the aggressor.

Madam President, Mr Commissioner, dear colleagues, over the last thirty years, we have seen dozens of white papers come and go – we are good at this, but I cannot imagine any of them being more important and coming at a more critical moment than this one. Despite everything we see happening all around us, we must recognise this white paper for what it is – an opportunity to shape our own future for the next generations on our own terms with our own tools. It is time to be bold in ensuring that we work towards a total defence strategy, one that combines military and civilian assets to ensure that we are no longer exposed to hostile powers to our east. One that demonstrates our commitments to our allies. One that does everything in our power to invest our political, economic, and military capital into securing our citizens. Restoring deterrence is our primary objective. Our enemies must know and see that war against Europe and our allies is hopeless, and to do so requires us to undertake a strategic audit of European military forces and civilian assets to ensure that we outpower our enemies. The next years are a key opportunity for us to turn Europe from security consumer to security provider. We have all the tools we need to achieve this. We only need to maintain our political will.

Madam President, Commissioner, Dear colleagues, Ahead of the Madrid Summit in 2022, NATO predicted that in the event of an invasion, the liberation of the Baltic States would take place within 180 days. This would mean experiencing war twice - once when Russians invade and again when NATO liberates. But thanks to NATO, after this summit, the strategy changed to defense from the first meter, not counting the days. However, this strategy also requires additional investment. The Baltic States alone need to invest at least 10 billion in security infrastructure to make this strategy a reality. This is a small figure for Europe, but huge for countries with a couple of billions of annual defence budgets. We would love to earn more to grow our defence spending faster, but also our economy in the box. In the bush not because we would be stupid or lazy, but because no one wants to invest in artillery shots at a distance from the aggressor. Ultimately, however, we are talking about the security of the whole of Europe, and every billion that will not be invested in strengthening Europe's borders may turn into the hundreds of billions that will be needed to rebuild part of Europe.

Dear Chair, Hello, Commissioner, Hello, colleagues! Some time ago, NATO Secretary General Rute visited the SEDE Committee. He said that if we invest insufficiently in our defence, then we may have to move to New Zealand or learn Russian. I will add to what Mr Rutes said. Only those who are lucky will have this opportunity. Those who will be less successful may have to move in livestock wagons to a village in Siberia. Even less successful will be shot in the basements of their own houses according to pre-prepared lists. Such lists exist, inter alia, now. Because both the Baltic States and Ukraine have already gone through all this during the Soviet occupation. Ukraine is going through it again. And we see that in Russian methods for 80 years nothing has changed and will not change. Supporting Ukraine is therefore the largest and best and most effective investment in our own security and defence.

Hello, Madam President, Hello, dear colleagues! So it happened that I also had to be born in the Soviet Union and spend a moment there. And when all this collapsed and we regained our independence, we were all very happy that there will certainly never be a war in Europe again. Everything is divided, everything is happy, but the reality is different. Times have turned out to be changing, and I agree with my colleague that we have to put up with the new reality. The new reality is that if we want to preserve our European values, then we must become physically strong and be able to defend them physically as well. That's the only way to prevent this war if you do it wisely. It is not money thrown into the wind, it is investment in jobs, investment in the economy and also in housing, and, if someone does not think so, to look at what the housing situation is at the moment in Bahmouth, Severodontsk or Rubezhny, or anywhere else where Russian liberators have been.

Hello, Mr President, Hello, Commissioner. Hello, dear colleagues! Since the previous debate on the shadow fleet, two broken cables in the Baltic Sea and one illustration of an ecological disaster in the Black Sea have passed. A few dozen ships have been sanctioned, but several hundred are still in black work. But ships are already just transport. In essence, it is sanctioned oil – where it is transported and who buys it. And here are some interesting coincidences. Since the introduction of the sanctions against Russia's oil, its imports into the EU have, of course, fallen dramatically, but the needs have not already diminished. And so it has happened that we are partially offsetting this decline with oil products from India and this volume has increased several times. According to various data, about 60% of the shadow fleet goes directly to India. Probably, or maybe, that's a coincidence, even though I don't want to believe it. We want our book publishers to be able to prove the origin of each tree from which the paper for their books is made. But perhaps we should also treat imports of petroleum products into Europe in the same way, because otherwise it may turn out that we ourselves finance, at least in part, not only the Russian aggression in Ukraine, but also the causing of ecological disasters and damage to our own critical infrastructure. Because sometimes the biggest fights are on the mirror.

Dear Chair, Hello, colleagues! Commissioner, First of all, before being happy about the good impact of the sanctions, it is worth remembering that the data are nevertheless produced by the Russian official authorities, which, as happened, tend to lie about them too, and that is why this fleet probably also exists. And we are in a situation where hundreds of old rusty ships are wandering through the seas, not only feeding this Russian war machine with billions of dollars every day, but these are basically time bombs that will sooner or later also lead to an ecological catastrophe. The so-called shadow fleet - and the strangest thing about all this is that we see these ships - we know what they are doing. They belong to someone, someone charters them, someone pays for it. But it turns out that we can't do anything about it, or maybe we don't want to do it well enough. There are wonderful inscriptions next to the European Parliament, 'Democracy in Action', but what we need to understand is that democracies also need to be active in order to continue to exist and safeguard their values. In nature, as we know, the one who adapts better survives. And unfortunately, speaking in sports terminology, at the moment this result is 0:1 for the benefit of the aggressor and dictator. Now the ball is on our side. If we don't make our move, then we can also lose this game. And perhaps I also understand that this is not just a problem for the European Union: it is indeed a problem and a challenge for Western democracy as a whole. That is why I call on all these Western democracies to come together and do something for real so that we safeguard our values.

Mr President, dear colleague, so the strategy when Russia infiltrates other countries with their spies and saboteurs is proven since 2014. They just do it, and we know it. And of course, security risks are complicated. It's not always about amounts; it's about quality sometimes. And of course, it's a question of trust also and Hungarians' friendship with Russia. Me personally, yes, it makes me worry about even 14 of them – probably those Russians and Belarusians couldn't get in through other countries – as I come from the country which already fights this hybrid war with Russia. Moreover, I personally was affected by sabotage threats – luckily, just threats. So the only thing I can say is, yes, those risks are real. And probably there is a truth that it's not only about Hungary, but about all of Europe. Those risks are real.

Dear Chair, Hello, colleagues! I'm going to speak Latvian. One of the biggest mistakes is to believe that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a local conflict. No, it is a year-round plan to rebuild the Russian empire, the first step, the results of which determine whether or not the next steps will be taken. Therefore, our choice at the moment is not to give or not to give arms to Ukraine. It is a choice where we will use this armament – let Ukrainians win it or wait for it to be used here. These days around the European Parliament we see a lot of people in forms that protect us. They are well armed, and their hands are not tied. Ukraine does exactly the same thing: it protects us. But we still hesitate to arm them. In addition, the wall puts their hands on them, because we are afraid of escalation. I grew up in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed and there was still a Soviet army on the territory of Latvia. Then conflict management with the Russian mentality was the basis of survival, and I can [...].