Speeches

Mr President, dear Commissioner, this is really an issue of broader relevance. In this time of widespread social media manipulation, public broadcasters play an increasingly important role as a source of reliable information and quality debate. That is why it is important to condemn any attempts of the government, of any country, in this case in Lithuania, to undermine the independence of the country's public broadcaster. I am speaking from my own experience, which comes from Latvia, where the public broadcaster is also under political pressure constantly, especially from the far right. If a Member State takes actions that compromise the independence of a public broadcaster, it is not just a national issue; it is a breach of shared commitments, including the European Media Freedom Act. Public broadcasters are meant to be independent, not controlled. An attempted takeover, especially if driven by political actors, threatens editorial independence and objectivity, it threatens media freedom, it threatens the rule of law and it threatens democracy itself.

Dear Chair, Dear Commissioner, Dear Minister, It is clear that Putin's Russia is ready to exploit any of our weaknesses against us. This applies to espionage, cyber-attacks and their information warfare. But the European institutions are still, I think, largely living in such a blissful ignorance. I think we all need to work on changing the culture of security itself. Lessons must be learned from the scandalous cases we have had in recent years, such as Members working here for Russia for years – the Zhdanok case was mentioned in 2024 – as well as, of course, cooperation with Russian propaganda media among Members. And, of course, also such clear cases of espionage among employees that have also occurred in recent years. Therefore, there are tasks that need to be done. Firstly, the Commission should work on cooperation between the security services of the Member States, moving towards a single European independent investigation capacity, directly to the institutions. The Council, for its part, must, in my view, work much more on the list of sanctions, both for individuals and for companies, which very often hide behind them as once Russian agents of influence in Europe. Because these are the tasks. Merry Christmas! Happy New Year!

Madam President, dear commissioner, dear rapporteurs, today marks an important and necessary step forward for the European Union. Phasing out Russian gas is not only a response to Russian aggression and changing geopolitical reality, it is also a statement of our values and our priorities. By reducing our dependence on this external supplier, we strengthen our own security, resilience and unity. In the Parliament, we have chosen cooperation over coercion, sustainability over vulnerability, and long-term stability over short-term convenience. It will take serious work to implement this regulation properly, but this transition is also an opportunity. It accelerates investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency and – most importantly – diversified supply routes. It creates jobs, drives innovation and moves us closer to climate neutrality. Most importantly, it ensures that Europe's energy future is shaped by democratic choices, not political pressure.

Mr President, dear colleagues, I want to thank you, Madam Commissioner, for helping Moldova on its way to Ukraine, especially in those fields of fighting hybrid warfare and disinformation, because Moldova belongs to Europe and Moldovan people have clearly demonstrated that. But this is also about our own strategic considerations: to lose Moldova to Russia would mean a big geopolitical loss for Europe and our own security. Moldova is a key partner in containing Putin's Russia. We have to be serious about that, and we have to draw our lessons from the Georgian experience, where Russia succeeded in organising the anti-European backlash with all the consequences. And right now, approaching elections, we have to do everything to show Moldovans that they are welcome in Europe and we stand with them.

Madam President, Madam Commissioner, first of all, I want to congratulate Anna for an excellent report. To me, of course, the key part of that report is the resilience. We can't work on a single market for energy and electricity, we can't decrease prices for our citizens, if we do not think about the security of our networks. I think that two elements are equally important, and they are covered in the report. These are cyber and physical infrastructure. The number of cyber-attacks has increased and that's why the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and the Cybersecurity Act are really vitally important. And as for the physical infrastructure, the defence of our strategic infrastructure, especially undersea cables, in this age of growing offshore wind, is crucial. Security measures like sonar, like undersea drones, like sensors. The world is not secure anymore and our energy systems are targeted by unfriendly forces. Let's be aware of this and act accordingly.

Mr President, Mr Commissioner, this initiative is really good, but of course, long overdue. Russia generated EUR 242 billion in fossil revenue in 2024 alone. This is more than it has spent on the whole war in Ukraine and in that sense I think we have to really stop financing Putin. I think the steps that have been proposed by the plan are really good. I mean, the ban on new contracts and existing spot contracts by the end of 2025, complete phase‑out of long‑term gas contracts by the end of 2027, and dealing with the shadow fleet, of course. But there is one important point I want to mention. This is what we really need: national phase‑out plans to enhance transparency and traceability of who is buying what and consuming what. If we do not do this, some Member States can still go on supporting Ukraine in words, but helping to finance Putin's war machine in deeds.

Dear Mr President, Dear Ms Virkunena, I very much like that in the title of today's debate, however, security and defence come first. And in that sense, I think we all have reason to be optimistic about this new ReArmEU a fund that means that Europe is gradually taking security seriously. Well, we are, of course, all waiting right now White paper. At the same time, there are two big questions that will determine whether this project will continue successfully or not. Firstly, it is a question of whether a change in the deficit conditions is really enough to motivate Member States to invest more in their national budgets for defence, also with this new total borrowing of 150 billion, or whether there is a need for other instruments, common funds. Secondly, how will Europe help to strengthen this common eastern border with the aggressor countries, with Russia and Belarus? There has been a lot of speech in this house that Putin's and Lukashenka's regimes are a threat to the whole of Europe and not just to a few Member States. Well, this belief should finally be strengthened by deeds.

Madam President, Madam Commissioner, as already noted this morning by Prime Minister Tusk, we should concentrate today not on guessing what the next steps of the new American administration could be, but what we ourselves can do in order to bolster our own safety and security. But let me ask you, what is the strength of the EU? It is not about commanding armies. We have NATO. Therefore it is our economic and technological might, our industry and our single market. And let's be clear, we are not exploiting it to bolster our security and defence to the full extent, because also the legislation is being delayed. In this case, the European defence industrial programme, EDIP, was published already almost a year ago, and the Parliament hasn't even properly started to work on it to promote defence and security, the defence industry and our single market in defence, which is really painfully lacking in the EU. Time is running out, dear colleagues: let's proceed from words to deeds at last. Let's help Ukraine and let's help ourselves.

Dear Mr President, Dear Ms Virkunena, It seems to me that for many colleagues in this house, Russian hybrid attacks are something new and unusual. This is not the case with us in the Baltic States. We have already seen this from Putin's repertoire, namely the instrumentalisation of migrants, the distortion of global navigation systems, which the representative of the Council has already spoken about, but also the strategic infrastructure, the cables that these shadow fleet vessels are destroying. I think that the instruments at our disposal now need to be used in full swing. First, all shadow fleet vessels – their owners must be included in the sanctions, and not only those 70. I think that there are also instruments for insurance in maritime law to stop such movements. And finally, the European Union and the Commission must also stand firm on the possibility of closing the Danish Strait if these ships threaten not only the ecology of the Baltic Sea, but also all our vital security interests and critical infrastructure. In other words, the solidarity-based and serious response now from the European Union, together with NATO, is the only one capable of stopping the aggressor.

Madam President, Commissioner, well, last week's attacks towards the C‑Lion1 cable between Finland and Germany, just like the earlier Balticconnector damages, these are the signals that we have to take these threats seriously. These are not separate incidents. These are the elements of continuous Russian hybrid warfare against our critical infrastructure. Right now, I think we have to send a clear signal that we know what is going on and who is standing behind that. Two points about how to address the threat come to mind. First of all, let's use our technological superiority. There is a lot of innovation going on in many European countries, in particular in my home country, Latvia, in undersea drones, sensors, monitoring. This has to be developed in the long term. The second issue is that let's keep open the possibility of the closure of the Baltic Sea as an option on the table. We need here a coordinated EU response, because we are dealing with a long‑term necessity to deter the Russian aggressor.

Madam President, first of all, I just want to thank President Niinistö for the excellent and very timely report. I think tonight it was probably rather difficult because the most difficult thing was to treat Vladimir Putin like a natural disaster or a climate change, but nevertheless, it's accomplished. And what we can follow from this report, there are three points of action I want to mention. First of all, the European funds – the main instrument of the European Union – must be made available to strengthen our preparedness. Right now, let me remind you, colleagues, many European funds exclude not only military purposes, but also dual uses. This is about structural funds, Horizon Europe and things like that. The second thing is we really need to strengthen the EU-NATO interface, especially in cases of emergency, just like noted in the Niinistö report. And the third thing is that the EU budget is not enough to reactivate the European defence industry. We need to incentivise private investment to provide long-term perspective for the defence industry, and to help increase our competitiveness and our welfare.

Madam President, Mr Reynders, of course the activities of the shadow fleet is really a serious loophole in our sanctions policy. Let me remind you that the cap on Russian oil was introduced in September 2022. Now, more than two years later, it turns out that this cap is easily circumvented by the shadow fleet, which has been going on for all those two years. So what should we do right now? First of all, what are the countries that sell those uninsured ships to Russia? I think that Europeans deserve to know that, especially if we are dealing with a Member State. Secondly, we should use all the arsenal of international maritime law to prevent those ships from moving through our territorial waters. Especially, I'm talking about the Baltic Sea, which is particularly vulnerable to possible ecological disaster. Many of those steps have already been taken by the UK and the US. I think that Europe should follow suit as soon as possible.

Madam President, thank you, Mr Letta, for your excellent report. Well, of course, the single market is a strength of the EU: it's the main instrument. This is how we achieve our goals. But what are actually our goals today? Let me remind you that the Russian aggression in Ukraine is still going on. And the Russian attack on an EU country is possibly, still, a question of the nearest future. And that's why I really like the part in your report which deals with a common market for security and defence industries. This is a real necessity for the EU right now. Some 80 % of the military help to Ukraine is right now spent on non-European materials. But how to achieve that common market? European investment in defence is lagging. It is very seriously hindered by red tape, by excessive regulatory requirements, by fragmentation. There is an immense potential of a single market in defence industry, but one must have a political will to implement it – and quickly. Time is running out.

Mr President, Madam Vice-President, dear colleagues, I think that the case of Georgia calls for reassessing our approach to the candidate countries as a whole. I'm talking mainly about the influence of authoritarian third countries. The EU has, unfortunately, often quietly observed the growing influence of Putin's Russia in countries like Georgia – but also in some other candidate countries, like Serbia – by means of corruption, by means of disinformation, by means of covert terrorist activity. Now, in the Georgian case, we have to move fast because elections are approaching in a few weeks. And the main task, I think, now is to send a clear message to the Georgian citizens: you can't be pro-EU and Putinist at the same time. Do not destroy your achievements. This is not just about candidate status or visa liberalisation. This is very much about the future of Georgia as a free, democratic and European country.

Dear Madam President, Dear colleagues, Dear Commission, The damage caused by the Russian aggression in Ukraine is staggering. There alone, documented losses have already reached more than €400 billion and millions of Ukrainians have lost their homes and lives. Russia must be held accountable for these atrocities, and it is our duty here to ensure that Ukraine and its people receive compensation. To this end, we must first confiscate the approximately EUR 300 billion of Russian state assets in European accounts and transfer them to the international compensation fund. But that alone is not enough. It is quite clear that no less amounts than this are in the accounts of various Russian oligarchs who are still legally operating in Europe. We must not be naive and imagine that we are dealing with some simple entrepreneurs. These are people who owe their wealth to the Kremlin and have been acting as agents of the Kremlin’s influence for years, including by spreading disinformation and all sorts of ‘Russian world’ initiatives. These include propagandists, special service agents and people close to Putin's clique. Their assets are also to be frozen and transferred to the Ukraine Reconstruction Fund. That's what I wanted to say. Glory of Ukraine!

Dear Mr President, Dear Commissioner, I think it is very strange that we are arguing here about the export of Ukrainian grain to Europe, but we cannot agree on a ban on imports from the aggressor countries, namely Russia and Belarus. The Commission says it is monitoring the situation. That is, in my view, completely insufficient. A common embargo is needed, not just monitoring. I will recall a few things. Every euro for Russia is the euro for the war, and these amounts have been increasing since the beginning of the war. Secondly, Russia is clearly dumping. She markets subsidised cereals and undermines the competitiveness of our farmers on the ground in Europe. And finally, of course, it is also a disinformation campaign to divide our support for Ukraine. The solution here is therefore an immediate embargo on the European entity and the victory of Ukraine.

Dear Madam President, Dear Mr Breton, I would say that short-term rental platforms are a very good example, first of all, of how Europeans can benefit from this digital economy. That is, both by renting properties and by renting them at a human price, for example, in front of large hotel chains. This is especially true, for example, for families with children, but of course this requires rules. There is a need for security about what you rent. There is a need for a clear exchange of data, especially already availability, availability of this data to our cities and municipalities. In this regulation, and here I can only say thank you to our rapporteur, Kim Van Sparrentak, this regulation strikes a good balance between, on the one hand, free competition and the necessary regulation. The next challenge is to further closely align all this legislation with our Digital Services Act, so that our digital legislation in all areas is coherent, understandable and also easy to implement and use in the Member States.

Dear Mr President, Dear Mr Breton, It is clear that restoring Europe's competitiveness is now a key thing for us to overcome those geopolitical challenges, and that is why I am very grateful to my colleague from Renew, Morten Løkkegaard, who has indeed given us clear orientations with this ten-point plan. I would like to focus on two things in the context of this plan. First of all, it is the implementation or enforcement Question 4 – How we implement European regulations and directives in the Member States, all from the Green Deal to the digital package now entering into force. What is really missing - fatally missing - is not a new initiative on the part of the Commission, but a uniform application and mutual harmonisation of the existing framework, and I therefore think that the idea of a new commissioner in the case of introduction should definitely be considered. The second thing, of course, is research and development expenditure. We can reach 3% in Europe already by 2027 if we want to. This goal has been set for a long time, but he unfortunately remains very utopian at the moment. This is a common European problem, where it is also up to the European institutions to encourage Member States to spend more on research and development.

Dear Madam President, dear colleagues, I think that the history of the twentieth century shows us all what happens when we allow our democratic institutions to be used for destructive, anti-democratic, totalitarian purposes. And it seems to me that our Member States have learned something from this, but the European Union as a whole looks like very little. I think that this recent case with this Latvian elected Member Ždanoka is really shouting in this regard. Not only has this honourable forum, the European Parliament, been used. European resources have also been used to spread Kremlin narratives, for example, to defamate the Baltic States over a long period of time, to justify aggression, to glorify de facto terrorist organisations that are now and have been occupying Ukraine since 2014. Do you really not know what to do here? How do we imagine that we will deal with anti-European governments in Europe – like Orban – if we do not deal with Russian agents in this house? That is why, in my opinion, this is the moment when we must still, during this mandate, initiate a thorough investigation into what has happened and, in the future, think about much more thorough scrutiny of Members, so that our democratic institutions are really shielded from the influence of malicious third countries.

Mr President, I would like to thank the colleagues of the Council, Commission, and fellow Members of the Parliament, especially my shadow rapporteurs, who worked on this legislation. It is indeed a small but an important milestone in our journey towards seamless digital public services in Europe. I’m glad that we achieved some of the key priorities for those negotiations. We stressed the need to ensure adequate support for local and regional authorities in implementing the Act. We underlined the importance of interoperability training for public sector workers and digital skills more widely. We agreed on the role of open-source solutions as a critical element in promoting transparency and cost-effectiveness in the development of those interoperable systems. We recognised respect for multilingualism and machine readability as well. We agreed on the establishment of interoperability regulatory sandboxes, without creating unnecessary loopholes in general derogations from the existing EU legislation. Since we strengthened the role of the European Parliament in the monitoring of the implementation of this regulation, I look forward to the Commission’s regular report to the Parliament on interoperability, how it’s proceeding. Colleagues, although this might seem a rather technical piece of legislation, it has a lot of political and practical importance on our path to digital transformation. I thank you for your commitment to bring the work on this legislation to a successful conclusion in such a short time.

Dear Chair, The motto of the Interoperable Europe Act could be ‘think before you do’ – to reflect and assess how our new decisions can be implemented digitally; how the new rules we want to adopt here will affect the ability of citizens, entrepreneurs to receive public services smoothly, digitally and without unnecessary borders across Europe; whether any new information system that we are going to buy for millions of euros will be able to talk to similar systems in other European countries and help people without unnecessary bureaucracy. For example, the register of taxes, property, residents and vehicles must be designed from the outset in such a way that they are able to communicate with the relevant systems both in their own countries and in other European countries. Unfortunately, there are still many data exchanges between authorities, either on paper or actually manually transferring even digital information. This severely hampers the delivery of public services to people and businesses and hampers economic development. Moreover, it is not just a matter of communication between different Member States. Interoperability is very often lacking even between services provided by one country. This law is also important to make it binding on those digitisation projects that currently have many billions of European funds, such as the Recovery and Recovery Fund and others. In fact, these principles should have been in force for a long time, at least for some 15 years, but better late than much too late. In future, all public authorities in Europe will have to assess new projects from an interoperability point of view, make sure they are interoperable across borders. This will save a lot of taxpayers' money and also speed up business processes. Importantly, this Regulation defines trans-European digital public services provided by authorities interacting with each other and with natural and legal persons. Examples of such services include exchange of academic diplomas, exchange of vehicle data for road safety, access to social security and health data, accreditation for public procurement, digital driving rights, etc. In our negotiations with the Council on this regulation, we stressed the need to ensure adequate support for local and regional authorities in the implementation of the acts. Multilingualism is a fundamental principle of the European Union and must also be preserved in digital services. Training public sector employees for interoperability is important. We also managed to agree on the creation of interoperability regulatory sandboxes to experiment and create new, innovative ways of delivering public services in a controlled environment. Finally, during the negotiations, we also strengthened the role of the European Parliament in monitoring the implementation of the regulation. Joint Research Centre (JRC) JRC has calculated the monetary impact of interoperability in Europe. This would reduce the annual time spent by citizens in their relations with the public sector by 25% and increase the number of citizens using public services online by 15%. This is a billion-strong efficiency for citizens and businesses. Ladies and gentlemen! We agree that the European economy needs a rapid digital transformation, but sometimes there is a lack of understanding of something else. In particular, the public sector – Member States, regional and local authorities, which provide services to citizens, and also the European institutions themselves – must go ahead and lead by example, rather than take a step backwards. Promoting this leadership is then also a key objective of the Interoperable Europe Act.

Dear Madam President, Mr Breton, Our discussion today takes place in such a rather turbulent context, because the coming days will indeed be such an hour of truth for European security. If the European Council does not act, the security of Ukraine and of Europe as a whole will be seriously threatened and, I think, it is in this context that we should urgently move forward with this programme for common defence investment in Europe. As rapporteur for the law on common defence procurement (EDIRPA), I know quite well how difficult it is to change European thinking, far from the usual, purely civilian way of thinking, but common procurements were achieved. The law on ammunition production in support of Ukraine, Ukraine, was also a success. ASAP. However, we now need to allocate funding to support the defence industry beyond these two programmes in 2025, as well as in the next phase of the European Union budget from 2028, so that our industry can count on it. We also need to create all possible tax frameworks and relax budgetary rules for common defence production programmes. Because if we do not complement our speeches and strategies with clear financial support, we can only blame ourselves if the aggressor, without God, wants to check the conformity of our words with our works.

Mr President, Vice-President, Russia’s actions in Ukraine can clearly be described as ecocide. The environmental damage to Ukraine is enormous. The estimates of the cost vary, but it is clear this is at least EUR 60 billion. The full extent of the damage will only be known once the war is over. However, in the meantime, Europe must act. We must find legal ways to hold Russia accountable for this ecocide. Until now, European countries have mostly dragged their feet on confiscating Russian assets in Europe to compensate for the damage done to Ukraine. An important step is registered by the Council of Europe – already mentioned, it has been agreed by 44 countries in May – it aims to document the environmental damage and to prepare the ground for concrete reparations for Ukraine. But there is also a sound legal basis to hold Russia accountable for crimes against the environment, like the Kakhovka Dam, already mentioned, and to make it compensate for the damage. Here I am referring to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and other international acts. What we need here is a clear political will to proceed and to make Russia pay for the damage.