Debate contributions by Ivars IJABS

Dear Chair, Dear Commissioner, Dear Minister, It is clear that Putin's Russia is ready to exploit any of our weaknesses against us. This applies to espionage, cyber-attacks and their information warfare. But the European institutions are still, I think, largely living in such a blissful ignorance. I think we all need to work on changing the culture of security itself. Lessons must be learned from the scandalous cases we have had in recent years, such as Members working here for Russia for years – the Zhdanok case was mentioned in 2024 – as well as, of course, cooperation with Russian propaganda media among Members. And, of course, also such clear cases of espionage among employees that have also occurred in recent years. Therefore, there are tasks that need to be done. Firstly, the Commission should work on cooperation between the security services of the Member States, moving towards a single European independent investigation capacity, directly to the institutions. The Council, for its part, must, in my view, work much more on the list of sanctions, both for individuals and for companies, which very often hide behind them as once Russian agents of influence in Europe. Because these are the tasks. Merry Christmas! Happy New Year!

Madam President, dear commissioner, dear rapporteurs, today marks an important and necessary step forward for the European Union. Phasing out Russian gas is not only a response to Russian aggression and changing geopolitical reality, it is also a statement of our values and our priorities. By reducing our dependence on this external supplier, we strengthen our own security, resilience and unity. In the Parliament, we have chosen cooperation over coercion, sustainability over vulnerability, and long-term stability over short-term convenience. It will take serious work to implement this regulation properly, but this transition is also an opportunity. It accelerates investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency and – most importantly – diversified supply routes. It creates jobs, drives innovation and moves us closer to climate neutrality. Most importantly, it ensures that Europe's energy future is shaped by democratic choices, not political pressure.

Mr President, dear colleagues, I want to thank you, Madam Commissioner, for helping Moldova on its way to Ukraine, especially in those fields of fighting hybrid warfare and disinformation, because Moldova belongs to Europe and Moldovan people have clearly demonstrated that. But this is also about our own strategic considerations: to lose Moldova to Russia would mean a big geopolitical loss for Europe and our own security. Moldova is a key partner in containing Putin's Russia. We have to be serious about that, and we have to draw our lessons from the Georgian experience, where Russia succeeded in organising the anti-European backlash with all the consequences. And right now, approaching elections, we have to do everything to show Moldovans that they are welcome in Europe and we stand with them.

Madam President, Madam Commissioner, first of all, I want to congratulate Anna for an excellent report. To me, of course, the key part of that report is the resilience. We can't work on a single market for energy and electricity, we can't decrease prices for our citizens, if we do not think about the security of our networks. I think that two elements are equally important, and they are covered in the report. These are cyber and physical infrastructure. The number of cyber-attacks has increased and that's why the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and the Cybersecurity Act are really vitally important. And as for the physical infrastructure, the defence of our strategic infrastructure, especially undersea cables, in this age of growing offshore wind, is crucial. Security measures like sonar, like undersea drones, like sensors. The world is not secure anymore and our energy systems are targeted by unfriendly forces. Let's be aware of this and act accordingly.

Mr President, Mr Commissioner, this initiative is really good, but of course, long overdue. Russia generated EUR 242 billion in fossil revenue in 2024 alone. This is more than it has spent on the whole war in Ukraine and in that sense I think we have to really stop financing Putin. I think the steps that have been proposed by the plan are really good. I mean, the ban on new contracts and existing spot contracts by the end of 2025, complete phase‑out of long‑term gas contracts by the end of 2027, and dealing with the shadow fleet, of course. But there is one important point I want to mention. This is what we really need: national phase‑out plans to enhance transparency and traceability of who is buying what and consuming what. If we do not do this, some Member States can still go on supporting Ukraine in words, but helping to finance Putin's war machine in deeds.

Dear Mr President, Dear Ms Virkunena, I very much like that in the title of today's debate, however, security and defence come first. And in that sense, I think we all have reason to be optimistic about this new ReArmEU a fund that means that Europe is gradually taking security seriously. Well, we are, of course, all waiting right now White paper. At the same time, there are two big questions that will determine whether this project will continue successfully or not. Firstly, it is a question of whether a change in the deficit conditions is really enough to motivate Member States to invest more in their national budgets for defence, also with this new total borrowing of 150 billion, or whether there is a need for other instruments, common funds. Secondly, how will Europe help to strengthen this common eastern border with the aggressor countries, with Russia and Belarus? There has been a lot of speech in this house that Putin's and Lukashenka's regimes are a threat to the whole of Europe and not just to a few Member States. Well, this belief should finally be strengthened by deeds.

Madam President, Madam Commissioner, as already noted this morning by Prime Minister Tusk, we should concentrate today not on guessing what the next steps of the new American administration could be, but what we ourselves can do in order to bolster our own safety and security. But let me ask you, what is the strength of the EU? It is not about commanding armies. We have NATO. Therefore it is our economic and technological might, our industry and our single market. And let's be clear, we are not exploiting it to bolster our security and defence to the full extent, because also the legislation is being delayed. In this case, the European defence industrial programme, EDIP, was published already almost a year ago, and the Parliament hasn't even properly started to work on it to promote defence and security, the defence industry and our single market in defence, which is really painfully lacking in the EU. Time is running out, dear colleagues: let's proceed from words to deeds at last. Let's help Ukraine and let's help ourselves.

Dear Mr President, Dear Ms Virkunena, It seems to me that for many colleagues in this house, Russian hybrid attacks are something new and unusual. This is not the case with us in the Baltic States. We have already seen this from Putin's repertoire, namely the instrumentalisation of migrants, the distortion of global navigation systems, which the representative of the Council has already spoken about, but also the strategic infrastructure, the cables that these shadow fleet vessels are destroying. I think that the instruments at our disposal now need to be used in full swing. First, all shadow fleet vessels – their owners must be included in the sanctions, and not only those 70. I think that there are also instruments for insurance in maritime law to stop such movements. And finally, the European Union and the Commission must also stand firm on the possibility of closing the Danish Strait if these ships threaten not only the ecology of the Baltic Sea, but also all our vital security interests and critical infrastructure. In other words, the solidarity-based and serious response now from the European Union, together with NATO, is the only one capable of stopping the aggressor.

Madam President, Commissioner, well, last week's attacks towards the C‑Lion1 cable between Finland and Germany, just like the earlier Balticconnector damages, these are the signals that we have to take these threats seriously. These are not separate incidents. These are the elements of continuous Russian hybrid warfare against our critical infrastructure. Right now, I think we have to send a clear signal that we know what is going on and who is standing behind that. Two points about how to address the threat come to mind. First of all, let's use our technological superiority. There is a lot of innovation going on in many European countries, in particular in my home country, Latvia, in undersea drones, sensors, monitoring. This has to be developed in the long term. The second issue is that let's keep open the possibility of the closure of the Baltic Sea as an option on the table. We need here a coordinated EU response, because we are dealing with a long‑term necessity to deter the Russian aggressor.

Madam President, first of all, I just want to thank President Niinistö for the excellent and very timely report. I think tonight it was probably rather difficult because the most difficult thing was to treat Vladimir Putin like a natural disaster or a climate change, but nevertheless, it's accomplished. And what we can follow from this report, there are three points of action I want to mention. First of all, the European funds – the main instrument of the European Union – must be made available to strengthen our preparedness. Right now, let me remind you, colleagues, many European funds exclude not only military purposes, but also dual uses. This is about structural funds, Horizon Europe and things like that. The second thing is we really need to strengthen the EU-NATO interface, especially in cases of emergency, just like noted in the Niinistö report. And the third thing is that the EU budget is not enough to reactivate the European defence industry. We need to incentivise private investment to provide long-term perspective for the defence industry, and to help increase our competitiveness and our welfare.

Madam President, Mr Reynders, of course the activities of the shadow fleet is really a serious loophole in our sanctions policy. Let me remind you that the cap on Russian oil was introduced in September 2022. Now, more than two years later, it turns out that this cap is easily circumvented by the shadow fleet, which has been going on for all those two years. So what should we do right now? First of all, what are the countries that sell those uninsured ships to Russia? I think that Europeans deserve to know that, especially if we are dealing with a Member State. Secondly, we should use all the arsenal of international maritime law to prevent those ships from moving through our territorial waters. Especially, I'm talking about the Baltic Sea, which is particularly vulnerable to possible ecological disaster. Many of those steps have already been taken by the UK and the US. I think that Europe should follow suit as soon as possible.

Madam President, thank you, Mr Letta, for your excellent report. Well, of course, the single market is a strength of the EU: it's the main instrument. This is how we achieve our goals. But what are actually our goals today? Let me remind you that the Russian aggression in Ukraine is still going on. And the Russian attack on an EU country is possibly, still, a question of the nearest future. And that's why I really like the part in your report which deals with a common market for security and defence industries. This is a real necessity for the EU right now. Some 80 % of the military help to Ukraine is right now spent on non-European materials. But how to achieve that common market? European investment in defence is lagging. It is very seriously hindered by red tape, by excessive regulatory requirements, by fragmentation. There is an immense potential of a single market in defence industry, but one must have a political will to implement it – and quickly. Time is running out.

Mr President, Madam Vice-President, dear colleagues, I think that the case of Georgia calls for reassessing our approach to the candidate countries as a whole. I'm talking mainly about the influence of authoritarian third countries. The EU has, unfortunately, often quietly observed the growing influence of Putin's Russia in countries like Georgia – but also in some other candidate countries, like Serbia – by means of corruption, by means of disinformation, by means of covert terrorist activity. Now, in the Georgian case, we have to move fast because elections are approaching in a few weeks. And the main task, I think, now is to send a clear message to the Georgian citizens: you can't be pro-EU and Putinist at the same time. Do not destroy your achievements. This is not just about candidate status or visa liberalisation. This is very much about the future of Georgia as a free, democratic and European country.