Speeches

Dear Mr President, Dear colleagues, Ten years ago, when Russia annexed Crimea, Europe did not understand the seriousness of this move and did too little. Two years ago, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, and since then Europe has done much more. We've done things we've never done before, and we're proud of it. But almost every decision has been preceded by long hesitations and excuses as to why one thing or another is impossible. Afterwards, it became clear that the impossible is still possible in every way, if only there is enough wit and determination. Unfortunately, every delay has a harsh price for the Ukrainian people. Today, the US Senate is voting on a $60 billion aid package, including the use of Russia's frozen assets to rebuild Ukraine. We in Europe have been discussing the same issue for over two years, but the assets of the aggressor have not yet reached the Ukrainians in need. The fact that the aggressor has to compensate for the damage caused is morally and legally the only possibility. We cannot delay any longer, but we must find a legally competent way of fully mobilising Russia's frozen assets to help Ukraine.

– Madam President, following the recent developments in relation to Sweden’s accession to NATO, I would like to move the following oral amendment to paragraph 96. I suggest to delete the section of the paragraph beginning with the words ‘takes note’ until the words ‘without any further delay’, and to replace it with the following text: ‘welcomes, in this regard, Türkiye and Hungary’s long—delayed decision to approve Sweden’s accession to NATO’.

Madam President, Vice-President of the Commission, representative of the Council, colleagues, I will not repeat what I said during my initial remarks. Let me just say that it has been a very constructive debate and I believe it has further underscored the need for a more confident and more militarily capable European Union. The CSDP implementation report and also the CFSP implementation report that we are going to be voting on later today, I believe lay out a good and credible path towards that more capable and more confident European Union. It’s been aiming at a moving target and it will continue to be aiming at moving target, but we will have to continue adjusting our sights and making the effort. I would like to finally thank all the colleagues, especially the shadow rapporteurs, as well as the staff, the assistants and the advisors who have contributed to putting together this report.

Mr President, President of the Commission, colleagues, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has made many of us reassess our previously held convictions and beliefs about European security needs. What is more, it has exposed vulnerabilities caused by decades of underinvestment in defence and security, both in individual Member States as well as at the European Union level. Let me say that, perhaps unlike in Finland or Estonia, the conservatives in some larger countries were also complicit in this strategic naivety. Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine must not succeed. It is our moral duty to support the fight for the survival of a sovereign, democratic European nation. But we have to understand that Ukraine’s defeat would also be devastating for EU security and present a mortal threat to the rules-based international order as we know it. Since Putin escalated his war over two years ago, the EU has taken many unprecedented steps. The use of the European Peace Facility to reimburse Member States for equipment donated to Ukraine and the initiative to ramp up production of ammunition and missiles are steps in the right direction. But I am sure that the history books will not judge us based on what we did or spent or what we said in this noble Chamber, but on whether we actually managed to help Ukraine win the war. So we need to do more and do it now. It’s a matter of utmost urgency because while we are talking, Russia is making gains on the ground that will be very difficult and costly to reverse later. We know that Putin’s Russia presents not only a threat limited to the indirect implications of the Ukraine war. There is and will be for the foreseeable future a direct military threat from Russia to EU Member States, territories and people. In order to provide credible deterrence against the threat or, if necessary, defend our continent, we will need to spend more on defence. It’s true that more Member States are spending 2 % of their GDP on defence than did so ten years ago, but we know that several larger Member States still fall short of that important threshold. Also, while we have launched on the EU level important initiatives such as EDF, EDIRPA and ASAP to boost joint research and innovation, promote joint procurement and address critical capability shortfalls, it is imperative that we also put additional money on the table. It is impossible to use the same money twice and cannibalising the budgets of existing programmes to finance newer ones is not going to be sustainable. On the defence-industrial level, I think it’s important that we understand that this new security reality will be with us for the foreseeable future, so our industries must have confidence that the orders from governments will not stop the moment the arms fall silent in Ukraine. Europe’s strategic autonomy, obviously, will not be unlimited. It must always be our first choice to act together with our friends and allies. It would be a great mistake to brush our allies aside just for the sake of going alone. Let me recall the words of NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg, who recently described the calls for creating a European nuclear deterrent without the US as unhelpful. But at the same time, we cannot fully ignore the uncomfortable truth that Donald Trump may return to the White House next year. Moreover, there is also far less of a consensus on Capitol Hill when it comes to America’s global security responsibilities than just a few years ago. We cannot completely rule out America’s turn to towards greater isolationism, and this possibility underscores the need to build a militarily stronger and more capable Europe. Finally, while we need to be ready to go alone if necessary and build alliances whenever possible, it is clear that beyond collaborating with our most immediate allies and fellow democracies, we are only going to prevail if we manage to form larger coalitions and convince the rest of the world that our cause is just. Immediately after the beginning of Putin’s full-scale war, we managed to pull together a coalition of more than 140 countries in the UN General Assembly. Today, after months of ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, recreating such a coalition would be very difficult. I am convinced that every one of us condemns the horrific terror attacks of Hamas and demands the immediate release of all the hostages. The vast majority of us are committed to a two-state solution that provides security for Israel and delivers on the legitimate aspirations of Palestinian people. If it is so, we need to do more, we need to do something very tangible in order to end this unnecessary suffering of millions of displaced and starving people. Only by doing this – which is also a moral obligation – we can convince the rest of the world that we are really committed to maintaining and strengthening the rules-based international order.

Mr President, colleagues, we know that Putin is a revanchist leader who wants to expand territory under his domination at the expense of his neighbours. We also know that he is not quite so stupid as to genuinely believe that Europe harbours similar territorial ambitions against Russia. He is fully aware we do not. He does fear one thing, however. He is genuinely afraid that our political system based on democracy, freedom and the rule of law is potentially attractive to Russian people and that could prove fatal for his authoritarian rule. That is why he is trying to exploit fault lines in our societies, fuel tensions, sow discord, interfere in our democratic processes, run malicious information operations. He wants to discredit liberal democracy, both in the eyes of Russian people as well as in the eyes of the citizens of our countries. He is actively recruiting people to help him in those sinister efforts, and he is ready to put serious money into it. While there may be individuals in the European institutions who do Putin’s bidding unwittingly out of stupidity or ideological conviction, there are others who are ready to betray Europe’s security interests and break our laws for personal gain. This is dangerous and deplorable, and we need to improve our alertness and situational awareness in order to take timely and decisive action.

Mr President, dear colleagues, two years into Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, what can be said? One thing is for sure: Putin has failed, his blitzkrieg has failed miserably. He has not managed to break the resolve of brave Ukrainian soldiers, brave Ukrainian people, or of the democratic world that continues to stand with Ukraine. And, indeed, somehow Mr Putin has even managed to double the length of his country’s border with the NATO alliance. So Putin has failed, but we are yet to succeed. We have said over and over again that we would stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes. But let us be clear, how long it takes depends directly on how much we give and how quickly we do it. So we must give more and we have to do it now. Let me repeat what I have said from this stand before: if all of our Member States and all our transatlantic partners were to pledge, on a sustainable basis, just one fourth of 1 % of our GDP for the support of Ukraine’s war effort, it would make a crucial difference. It would help to end this war and hand the Russian aggressor the decisive defeat it deserves. This would be the best gift we could give to our continent’s future security and prosperity.

Mr President, dear colleagues, just to pick up from where my colleague ended: ensuring Ukraine will emerge victorious requires continuous, sustained flow of aid from the international coalition of democratic nations, including weapons and ammunition. Unfortunately, this is not the case today. In order to make sure that we will not lose focus and that our collective support for Ukraine’s war effort will not fall victim to our internal political gridlocks, we should make a firm, measurable commitment similar to NATO’s famous 2% threshold for defence spending. If the Euro-Atlantic community and all other like-minded nations committed to Ukraine’s ultimate victory over the aggressor would allocate, until the war has been won, just a modest 0.25% of their GDP for supporting Ukraine, it would yield approximately EUR 120 billion annually, more than enough to ensure that there are no unwanted disruptions in the ability of Ukrainian military to fight back the aggressor. Moreover, it would effectively thwart any Russian hopes of military victory over Ukraine and deliver a clear message to the Kremlin that we will stand by Ukraine until the aggressor has been decisively defeated.

Madam President, colleagues, whether you call it taking out the peace dividend or, more correctly, chronic underinvestment in defence, the truth is that most, if not all, of our Union’s Member States have been doing it for far too long. Russia’s war against Ukraine has made that reality apparent for everyone. Yes, in response to Russia’s brutal aggression, the EU has demonstrated unity and resolve in providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine. But those donations have also exposed serious gaps in our collective preparedness for large-scale military conflict, and have further underscored the fact that our existing stockpiles and production capabilities of defence equipment and ammunition are far from adequate. Following the adoption of the recent short-term instruments EDIRPA and ASAP, the Commission has promised to come forward with a long-term European defence investment plan. But after significant delays, one may start to doubt whether this will happen at all during the current mandate of Parliament. EDIP, which would provide a strong regulatory framework, encourage joint research, production and procurement and create incentives for companies in both large and small Member States, is long overdue. We need it, and we need it now.

Madam President, colleagues, on the eve of his country receiving the EU candidate candidacy status, a Georgian citizen, Tamaz Ginturi, was killed by Russian occupying forces on the administrative boundary line between Georgian-controlled territory and the Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region. While the killing was a particularly brutal and violent crime committed by the occupants, it was far from an isolated event. Since Russia launched an aggression against Georgia and seized parts of its sovereign territory in 2008, there has been a constant stream of similar incidents, where Georgian citizens, local residents, have been harassed, where their human rights have been violated, the freedom of movement has been illegally restricted. Simultaneously, the Russian occupying forces and the so-called authorities of the illegal entities that they have propped up are moving on with a creeping annexation, modernisation and passportisation. Today, the EU monitoring mission is the only permanent international presence that operates close to the administrative boundary line, monitoring the situation on the ground. As such, it plays an important role in providing a modicum of stability in a tense and fragile situation. It is extremely important that we provide the EUMM with adequate resources that are urgently needed for it to carry out its mission. The US always supported and will always support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But while we demand the end to the occupation and the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, we should also do more to hold those immediate perpetrators of the human rights violations accountable. For that end, we call on the Council to put together, in consultation with Georgian authorities, a list of individuals responsible for the human rights violations and impose effective targeted sanctions against them.

Mr President, Commissioner, colleagues, let make just three brief points. First of all, reconstruction. It will be a long process, but it cannot wait until Ukraine has won the war. It will have to start now. Russia will eventually have to pay for all the damage they have done. But meanwhile, we must find legally sound ways to use the frozen assets of the aggressor to at least partially cover the cost of the effort. And we should make no mistake, reconstruction is going to be an enormous undertaking that requires the full participation of Ukrainian authorities and civil society, as well as the international community, including our Union. Secondly, the reconstruction effort must not take our focus away from continued and growing need for military assistance to Ukraine. The counteroffensive to take back illegally occupied parts of Ukraine is just getting underway and during the increasingly intense fighting, the attrition is going to be enormous. And finally, we must proceed swiftly and decisively with Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. For this is the only way to guarantee Ukraine’s and Europe’s security in a sustainable way.

Mr President, Commissioner, colleagues, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has exposed the serious impact the decades of underinvestment have had on Europe’s defence sector. This underinvestment obviously has also affected our collective defence industrial capacity and the related supply chains. As the war of attrition is dragging on and as Ukraine’s need for continued supply of ammunitions and missiles is becoming more evident and more pressing by the day. I strongly support the proposal for the regulation that is before us, both when it comes to financially supporting the reinforcement of our production capacities, as well as the creation of a mechanism to manage the bottlenecks in the supply chains. I also support the use of the urgent procedure in Parliament. It is clear that Ukraine’s defeat in the war would have a truly devastating effect for the whole rules—based international order, not just for Ukraine. And it is equally clear that Ukraine’s ability to repel the aggressor relies in very significant part on our continued support, including the provision of munitions and missiles. Therefore, we absolutely have to act decisively and without delay. Finally, I want to underline the need to approach the financing of the proposal in a responsible and sustainable manner. We know that the proposed budget for the initiative relies in big part on redirecting funds previously foreseen for EDF and EDIRPA, the latter of which is another new instrument whose aim is to incentivise defence procurement. It is important, I believe, to address both the supply and demand side of defence production and procurement, but it is going to be difficult to achieve both objectives by trying to create the illusion as if we could use the same money twice.

Mr President, the degree of support in Georgian society for the country’s European aspirations has been so high that it has been very easy for years for us to support Georgia’s aspirations. No serious political party has been able to fully ignore the degree of support that Georgians have expressed with regard to the country’s European future. Even those in power have always felt it necessary to pay lip service to those aspirations, even when their actions have spoken a different language. We’ve seen problems in the area of the rule of law, the independence of judiciary, media, freedom and political polarisation. I think the attempt by the Georgian Government and governing party to adopt the so-called Foreign Agents Law was just one example of a long list of problems in the area of rule of law in the country. What is concerning is that recently, even though the draft law was dropped, even the words do not support these aspirations. The ridiculous accusations against the European Parliament and the European Union will ... (The President cut off the speaker)

Mr President, dear colleagues, this war will have to end with every square inch of Ukrainian sovereign territory liberated. Because, otherwise, if Russia should walk out of this with territorial gains and with the current regime still intact and in power, the international rules-based order will have failed, if not entirely collapsed. I would like to underscore two points made by High Representative Borrell. First, implementation. It is commendable that the decision was taken to build the tanks, but now those tanks would really have to arrive and all countries who have equipment to spare will have to step up. Secondly, it is not simply sufficient to continue supporting Ukraine militarily, but we will have to step up the support significantly so as to turn the tide of the war and make sure that Ukraine emerges victorious. Finally, we should seek on this very issue unity in this House, deliberately heightening political partisanship is irresponsible. It is not helpful. It is not even elegant.

Mr President, High Representative, colleagues, at a time when the innocent Ukrainians continue to be killed by the Russian aggressors, I think it’s clearly premature to congratulate ourselves for our unity or resolve or anything else. Indeed, we have to do more and we have to give much more. In exactly one year from now, we are going to look back at the year 2023 and then, let’s be honest, the only yardstick with which we can measure our success or failure is our ability, or the lack thereof, to help Ukrainians to defeat the aggressor. When we say Ukrainians are also fighting for our future, it’s not mere rhetoric, because if indeed Russians are allowed – a UN Security Council permanent member nuclear state – if it is allowed to get away with grabbing additional territory from a much smaller democratic neighbour, this will effectively be the end of the rules-based international order, which among other things, has allowed us to build Europe as a successful peace project.

Mr President, dear colleagues, it has become absolutely clear that Russia can never win a victory over Ukraine on the battlefield. And they know that. And that’s why they are increasingly resorting to terrorising the Ukrainian civilian population on a huge scale. Russia’s intent is clearly genocidal. The statements by Russian leaders, denying the existence of Ukrainians as a nation and Ukraine as a separate country, clearly testify to that. While their intent is genocidal, the tactics they have chosen is terrorism. At this critical moment, we have to do more than we have done so far. We have to help Ukrainians get through this harsh Ukrainian winter by giving them equipment to keep the critical utilities operating as well as giving them financial support so as to keep the budget afloat. But we also have to dramatically step up the military aid that is giving Ukraine the weapons on the scale and of the kind that help them achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. That’s the best way to help save Ukrainian lives and achieve a decisive victory over the aggressor. Slava Ukraini!

Madam President, in light of the information that has become available since the deadline for plenary amendments, namely a statement that was made by the outgoing Public Defender of Georgia on 7 December, I propose to amend the text and add the following text: ‘Takes note of the statement of the Public Defender of Georgia on 7 December 2022, which calls on the President of Georgia to make use of the pardon mechanism concerning Nika Gvaramia as the case lacks justification and does not correspond to the fundamental principles of criminal law.’

Mr President, colleagues, even as a potential candidate country, Georgia today offers a very mixed picture. The signals coming out of the country are also very mixed, but I will try to start on a positive note. As an associated country, Georgia enjoys an exceptionally privileged partnership with the EU. I believe that full implementation of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA will continue to be the best way to develop Georgia’s economy and improve the welfare of its people. Moreover, we know that Georgians’ ambitions do not end with the implementation of the agreement and the DCFTA, indeed Georgia’s quest to join the Union enjoys overwhelming support among the population of the country. This overwhelming support for Georgia’s European future should allow the country’s political parties to come together, overcome their differences and dislikes, and work across the aisle towards a truly national goal. So it should be. In some policy areas indeed impressive reforms have taken place over the years. When it comes, for example, to the approximation of the national legislation with the EU acquis, Georgia continues to be a frontrunner among the aspirants in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. However, when it comes to demonstrating the ability of Georgia’s democratic structures and the country’s sustainable commitment to certain key European values, the narrow party political considerations and personal antagonisms of individual strongmen still seem to take priority over strategic national objectives. Such a toxic political culture could prove detrimental not only to Georgia’s European aspirations, but to the nation’s long-term security and prosperity as a whole. The EU and the European Parliament continue to stand ready to assist and advise Georgian authorities on how to successfully deliver on the legitimate aspirations of the Georgian people. The 12 priorities identified by the Commission as a precondition for achieving EU candidate status should be seen as a helping hand, and Georgian authorities should seek to make the best use of it. During the past months, the Georgian Parliament and Government have taken serious steps to address some of the Commission’s recommendations. However, the recommendations that lie at the core of the political polarisation still appear elusive. The policy areas where much more tangible progress is needed include the next phase of the judicial reform. Very little has happened here. The fight against corruption, ensuring media freedom, eliminating the excessive influence of vested interests, or the so-called oligarchs, as well as protecting minority rights. None of these can be resolved by the quick adoption of a single piece of legislation by a narrow parliamentary majority. Rather, they require a systemic implementation of complex reforms which can only be successful if the political opposition and civil society are genuinely involved in the process. One particular case we are carefully following is the election of the new public defender. I would like to commend how the process has been conducted so far, but I would also like to stress that in the end, the result is as important as the process. Therefore, an inclusive and transparent selection process has to result in the election of a truly independent and professional ombudsperson who has the full confidence of civil society. Let me refer to one of the very last statements by the now former public defender, Nino Lomjaria, regarding the court case and indictment of Nika Gvaramia. The statement said that the case lacks justification and does not correspond to the fundamental principles of criminal law. As such, the statement points to a number of key problem areas in Georgia today – the independence of the judiciary, media freedom, as well as the need for an independent public defender. Another outstanding issue, which is becoming more urgent by the day, is the fate of former President Mikheil Saakashvili. The European Parliament has repeatedly expressed our concern over the issue and has called for Mr Saakashvili’s prison sentence to be deferred, so as to allow him to seek medical treatment abroad. In the light of recent alarming reports, and as Mr Saakashvili’s health continues to deteriorate, the issue is becoming more urgent by day. I am fully aware that in Georgia, the legacy of the former President continues to be an extremely divisive issue. So what I would like to say very clearly is that we see his release as a purely humanitarian issue, and our call does not express legal, political or any other assessment regarding his case. Last, regarding the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine, I appreciate Georgia’s clear position in various international fora, notably the UN. But Georgia has consistently voted with the EU to condemn Russia’s unprovoked aggression and crimes against Ukrainian people. At the same time, I am deeply concerned about the rhetoric of some Georgian political leaders who accuse the European Union and our partners of wanting to drag Georgia into the war. These accusations are blatantly wrong. The EU has consistently supported and will continue to support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU is a peace project, and Georgia will never have to choose between Europe and peace. Indeed, choosing Europe means choosing peace. To my colleagues at the EP, I want to say that while we absolutely need to make sure that our would-be members progressively align with our common foreign and security policy instruments, and that the sanctions we have imposed on the aggressor are not evaded by third countries, we must always diligently follow the facts rather than our suspicions or insinuations. I believe that Georgia’s vital place is in Europe, but it’s for the Georgian politicians to deliver.

Madam President, stability and security in the broader Middle East is critical for global security. And on the other hand, instability and ongoing inter-state conflicts in the region have a negative spill-over effect for security and stability in all regions in the world, including Europe. In this light, I want to welcome the Commission’s strategic initiatives with regard to the Mediterranean and the Gulf. The Joint Communication on the Strategic Partnership with the Gulf rightly focuses on a number of key policy areas from global security to energy security to climate change and clean transition. But I would like to highlight one thing. While our cooperation with regional actors seeks to resolve the outstanding conflicts both within and between states, with a very strong focus on sustainable human security and protection of human rights and the respect of international law, there are other outside actors whose interference in conflicts in the region is driven by far more sinister motives. Therefore, at this very moment, when the rules-based international order is being challenged by Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, a truly strategic partnership for the Middle East is only possible through alignment on this critical issue. A couple of examples: While the EU’s Iran policy and our support for upholding the JCP way is driven and continues to be driven by the need and our determination to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Tehran regime, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that this regime is today supporting Russian aggressors in Ukraine with attack drones that are being used to destroy critical civilian infrastructure, or to the fact that the same regime is brutally cracking down civil unrest at home. Also, for years, Russia has been supporting Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime in Syria, both directly as well as through its proxies, notably the so-called Wagner Group, a terrorist organisation that is today also killing innocent people in Ukraine. Or on a different front, while the many members of the upper class may have had legitimate and self-interested reasons for the recent decision to cut positive action, it is clear that the decision also works in the interests of Russia and helps to fill its war chest. So while we absolutely need to pursue a strategic partnership, mutually beneficial strategic partnerships with the broader Middle East and have a big stake in helping to maintain stability in the region, our efforts must be guided by our commitment to preserving and strengthening the rules based international order and limiting the influence of those actors who want to destroy it.

Mr President, dear colleagues. Putin’s escalation of his war of aggression reveals Russia’s strategic failure. By his mobilisation, his illegal annexation and his nuclear sabre—rattling, he is desperately trying to raise the stakes so as to scare Ukrainians and their allies. But Ukrainians are not going to be intimidated by Putin’s bluster, and neither should we. Ukrainians’ courage and resolve in defending their homeland has been amazing throughout the conflict, but the recent success on the battlefield also owes to the support they have received and continue to receive from allies in Europe and elsewhere. In order to consolidate their recent gains, Ukraine needs much more of our support. Sure, we all want peace to come to Ukraine as quickly as possible. But, to be durable and sustainable, it will have to be a just peace. In the case of this war, this means the full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. After Putin’s sham referenda and declaration of annexation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity effectively means driving the occupiers out by force. The faster this happens, the sooner a just and durable peace returns to Ukraine. Yes, Europe has done a lot, but now is not the time for self—congratulation, for we have done much, but not enough, whether we compare our performance to that of the Americans or to our own previous commitments. We must not hesitate and we must not be afraid to give Ukraine all the weapons, including tanks, that they need to successfully complete the liberation of their country. Quick and decisive liberation of all Ukraine’s territory is the quickest path to a lasting peace and is thus actually de—escalatory. As to those who aspire to a diplomatic approach, I would say this – yes, when the liberation of all of Ukraine has been made irreversible, then we will indeed have a lot to discuss at the negotiating table, including how to make sure that all those responsible for war crimes are brought to justice, and also the issue of what needs to become of Russia so that it can never again slaughter innocent people and threaten international peace.

Mr High Representative, recent positive news from the Ukraine battlefield – in part due to the Western military equipment donations, mostly US, but also European donations, the attrition during wartime obviously is enormous, so Ukraine continues to need all our donations. You mentioned the use of a clearinghouse mechanism. You mentioned the use of the European Peace Facility. My question is this. Two questions, actually. What is your very blunt assessment, to what degree are we currently able to satisfy Ukrainian needs so that they could consolidate the gains they’ve made in the battlefield? And secondly, even short of a European Defence Minister or a European army, can we right now do something to move beyond the role of just coordination between the Member States and take on the more active role as the European Union when it comes to delivering military aid to Ukraine?

Mr President, dear colleagues, there are only two possible ways of resolving the vital security deficit of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The first one is weakening Russia beyond the point where it can present a real threat. And the second one – more realistic, in my opinion – is the full integration of those three countries into the European economic and security structures. It is true that none of those three is today ready to function as a full member of the European Union. So candidate status is just a first step of a much longer way. But we must be clear and sincere with regard to the final objective, which is membership. What we must not do is tell Ukrainians that we support their aspirations, but then turn to our own voters, give them a wink and say that this status doesn’t mean that Ukrainians are going to be full members. Finally, while everyone must proceed on their own individual merit, we must not ignore the dangers of splitting the three Eastern partners up at this critical juncture and therefore leaving one or two more vulnerable, because all these peoples deserve a place in Europe.

Madam President, dear colleagues, the resolution we are going to vote on tomorrow is primarily dealing with the media freedom and safety of journalists in Georgia and there is plenty to be critical about on that front. Georgia has, over the last two years, nosedived in the Global Media Freedom Index. Despite the solid legal framework, the physical safety of journalists and media representatives has significantly deteriorated, as illustrated by the violence by far-right groups against the participants in last year’s pride march and against the journalists covering the event. More recently, it has been illustrated by the sentencing of Mr Gvaramia, a well-known media figure, on rather dubious charges. Obviously, the problems of Georgia and the challenges it faces go beyond the media scene. We all do have legitimate concerns about recent negative trends in the area of rule of law and democracy more generally. The recent conduct of the Georgian Government has, quite frankly, been frustrating and disappointing on many fronts. I do believe that in a situation like this, we need to adopt a more resolute and more demanding line in our communications with our Georgian rulers, so they really understand that it is they who have to deliver to the Georgian people when it comes to Georgia’s European aspirations. However, I would like to also point out that a policy on our behalf will have to be based on a comprehensive and well thought-through strategy, not merely frustration and emotions. So I urge us all to carefully analyse potential consequences and plan for our next steps, so that our no doubt well-intentioned steps do not inadvertently undermine the legitimate aspirations of the Georgian people or our own strategic interests in the region.

Mr President, the implications of the Russian aggression against Ukraine for European security are really profound, and that is very well understood by our people, as best reflected by the Finnish and Swedish Governments’ decision to apply for NATO membership now, but also by the Danish people’s decision at the referendum to lift their opt-out on EU defence. So our people really believe that we need more collective security. The second implication is that the large-scale conventional war has made a very forceful return to the European continent and we need to prepare for that, because clearly we weren’t sufficiently prepared when this aggression was launched. Neither when it comes to defending our own countries against such a threat and nor when it comes to delivering assistance to our partners. Even, let’s be honest, our very good strategic compass deals more with the evacuation from Afghanistan than it deals with scenarios such as the conflict we are seeing right now. And finally, we must be honest. Putin’s Russia is ready to take much more pain as a price for its adventurous effort of restoring an empire than we previously thought. So we need a much more concerted and sustained effort to make sure that we are able to weaken Russia’s economy and military machine.

Yes. Thank you. A short follow up. Much of the discussion this century about European security and defence has taken place in a situation where the US focus on European security has been diminishing and the physical footprint of the Americans on European soil has been shrinking. Now, at least for the short term, we have seen this process reversed, to the extent even that, for the first time in many, many years, Americans are deploying more than 100 000 troops to Europe. Do you think that we should try to make this reversal permanent? And if so, what can we do to do so?

High Representative, thank you very much. I think that the Strategic Compass is a very good and actionable document. But, as so often happens, we have been overtaken by events. And, no doubt, we have to adapt the implementation to the significantly changed security situation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I hope that most of the priorities in the document will remain valid and relevant. One that definitely will is EU-NATO cooperation, NATO being the primary provider of military security to all of its European member countries and also an organisation whose primary task is to defend the member countries against foreign aggression. My question is: what response, if any, have you received from NATO HQ and from the capitals of the non-EU member countries of NATO to our Strategic Compass? And, conversely, what are your expectations with regard to the NATO’s forthcoming new Strategic Concept?